

Allaire 56352

Adan 78351

ANW

Bull Nov 10

K could not afford the limitation of (turning his  
discreet) as a condition).

Ciba reaction to Test (Kitter)

S "

recon

- ✓ Instructions to Adm, 29 Oct (?)
  - ✓ Bell memo to Pres, 10 Nov:  
ff SU Drago
  - ✓ Nolfe memo of 3 Oct on types of war.
  - ✓ SANE of 18 Sept on Military Buildup in Cuba  
(SU is probably western... also more likely than PACM,  
but still very unlikely; would expect US reaction; change in  
SU policy).
  - ✓ Mandelbaum memo of 9 Oct<sup>Oct</sup>: trend toward introduction of R-3M;  
probably ads.
  - ✓ McNamara, 2 Oct; 6 categories.
  - ✓ JCS memo, 15 Oct (?)
  - ✓ J-5, 19 Oct
- See: R letter of 27 Oct to Pres? Black Saturday
- up
- Nitze instructions in One-sidedness prep, sent to NAC 27 Oct
- NAC minutes, 28 Oct
- JCS comments on Rancovat
- Draft instructions to Rikletter for NAC, Oct. 27
- Final lunch with Devis, 27 Oct
- Comments on nature of government by each party.

AJW

He actually brought us into a "position of strength" in  
strategic field (and maybe, with the non-SCE  
would have done it except for being intelligent  
estimate; see Lyngton article, Henges, JFK speech).

Get our expectation of being "stalemate" — plus  
willingness to plan for it by increasing conventional  
arms (but this already took place to permit  
initiative; as in Hungary, Poland/Polish riots, etc.) —  
kept him from exhibiting strength or from  
developing a strategy of strength.

Instead, we have remained defensive, tried to  
a strategy of weakness; a desperate strategy (NSC 68)  
appropriate to, say, France versus Soviets; a  
strategy of punishment which aims (de Gaulle) to  
"tear an arm off" — though actually big enough  
to strengthen, if used "French-style" (NATO-style)  
(France didn't have strat. bombardment doctrine then) —  
or to disarm SO, considering actual SO forces.

(NSC 68 seems related to — my estimates of future SO capability!) —

written on estimate of aggression by third party.

AJW

Cuba shows importance of initiative capability; though problem of the "Metamorphosis of Conflict." (Bundy; Bell more; form of this Horizontal Escalation — when SC Vertical Escalation — can be a way of rationalizing inaction, or to conceal form of any risk whatever (if either out of escalation).

Only adequate conventional forces permit us to probe, to counter SC move with threat threatening, to cast back a limited SC move (e.g., Berlin), to assist revolt — without working defenses unacceptably elsewhere. Superiority is not needed for these purposes; repel this limited move, challenge them to raise stakes.

Cuba shows that air nuclear superiority does not deter them from [avoids from limited aggression - McN] highly provocative probe of our position (looking for weakness, which it may find!), attempt to demonstrate suspected weakness, initiation or shyness, to intimidate us or split Allies or weaken our stance of aggression etc. by third party.

say, very rapidly,

AJW

We must be prepared to act fast and  
decisively, in informed way (with US Govt) — to  
Teach them a lesson — to make sure that  
they learn from this experiment what we want them  
to learn, including costs & risks of such tests.

Also, we want people to teach allies (+  
public; and...) : e.g. to rely on US, not to fear SU  
public, strength of partition + unity, etc. etc. rather than  
to learn division lesson. Even if SU learns right  
lesson, it can try to reverse lesson by preventing US Allies  
from learning right ones — especially if US cooperates in  
(or, does in Berlin)  
so much. J. ~~likely~~, <sup>so very</sup> expect ~~likely~~ to teach  
their tanks + tanks like killers what we want them  
to learn: which R seems to be doing! (Dec 13)

Among contingencies to be planned for (i.e.  
against): certain likely, dangerous proposals or moves  
within the Administration during a crisis; Participate  
there, paper a point against, counter-proposals. To what  
positions/attitudes do we want US/盟友 committed?

Study:

- 1) Inflation of gold inflow.
- 2) Impact of Defense Budget.
- 3) Programming, Procurement practices, Costing, Budget Process

SI R&D Policy

5) Stockpile, mobilization, reserves in Controlled War/LW/Potential Conflict

6) Systems Analysis + Strategic Choices

7) C+C in Controlled Response

Crisis

Limited War

R+D

Problem common to Strategic Intelligence, Warning, Operational Crisis,

8) Organizations for Operations, Plans, Intel, R+D, Procurement,  
State - White House - DOD

% Safety, Control, Stability; Permissive Strike

ASW  
Availability for new record

Dec. 14:

X Parker MM; see Hoag (when can they be bound?)

2) Cell Hill, Savage

X See memo to George; talk to George. (Brown, Wolfe, Givens)

X Koeg? 27 Dec, 9

3) Xmas setting?

6) Letters / bills

7) Get Dietel

8) Get ticket to Mich.

X Write travel expenses!

Littles, Kinnish, Wolfe (Din, phone) on

Brown or missing

Silliger or W&I

(Colen review on A-bomb, H-bomb, B-bomb)

Paul Hammond

Klein, Marshall, Colen, Jones (Hoffman))

Katz, Digby (Silliger, de Ward) Silliger, Hoag (Littles) (Austin)

AJW  
possibly for new record?

1. The camera has a built-in flash.	True
2. The camera has a built-in timer.	False
3. The camera has a built-in lens.	True
4. The camera has a built-in light meter.	True
5. The camera has a built-in flash.	True
6. The camera has a built-in timer.	False
7. The camera has a built-in lens.	True
8. The camera has a built-in light meter.	True
9. The camera has a built-in flash.	True
10. The camera has a built-in timer.	False
11. The camera has a built-in lens.	True
12. The camera has a built-in light meter.	True
13. The camera has a built-in flash.	True
14. The camera has a built-in timer.	False
15. The camera has a built-in lens.	True
16. The camera has a built-in light meter.	True
17. The camera has a built-in flash.	True
18. The camera has a built-in timer.	False
19. The camera has a built-in lens.	True
20. The camera has a built-in light meter.	True

K: "SU has no need to achieve its objectives by means of war, or by military means."

But: "SU has no need to deploy missiles outside its borders."

(3)

Renton: in last quarter of 1961, SU produced more steel than US, for the first time (US was producing at 50% of capacity).

[Calculate current capability in US for Type II Deterrence; for expansion of aid; for buildup of conventional capability]

Renton: Only if, by economic competition, we can overtax the non-military sector of SU can we put pressure on SU to reduce its military spending, to divert resources to non-military sector.

UN Regional Universities.

17 Dec.

Rentler: Third Missiles and Missiles Men

[Title for article on Cuba, Suddenly Last Autumn]

[Predict cost of crises, cost of small wars

(cost of exercises, maneuvers). Look at costs incurred

(by components) in Lebanon, Thailand, Quemoy, Cuba;

estimate for given scenarios. Compare to costs of

measures to reduce prob. of crises, wars: info systems,

C+C, posture, Cost of WWII, Korea, Counter-guerrilla.

Costs of forces expended, transport, stocks, etc.;

value  
cost of capital destroyed;

[Calculate: value of photos of Cuban missiles — in

convincing Allies, public, US decision-makers, reducing

disagreement: as opposed to other forms of intelligence.

Contrast to cost of operations. Consider gaps in  
capability for photo recon.]

Rentler:

K's confidence is based on his belief that our form of society can meet the challenges of peace.

He knows that we can unite and act effectively in time of war; but doesn't think our factions can coordinate effectively in time of low tension.

[How much is K counting on the advantages of dealing with an alliance? e.g., was this a major factor in US's move into Cuba: was this big surprise, Allied reaction? Or perhaps: US more decisive + firm + fast enough to win Allied respect and followship? Improved US crisis warfighting may be the way to avoid the weaknesses of crisis allied policy. Formulate the Allied responses, Alliance responsibilities, that strengthen Allied cohesion and effectiveness in a crisis; by law, planned US responses, institutional changes to forestall Allied dissolution or paralysis or surrender].

[For crises: Plan + prepare for uncertainty, ignorance, mistakes, and different opinions, differences in beliefs, info and goals within US gov, and within Western Alliance.]

[Political "responsible" decision-maker must evaluate a component of national strategy for which he is responsible not in the context of a system optimized as a whole, with other components adapted to this one, but in the context of the probable states of other components. This requires him to know the current and But the likely (or possible, within given period & by certain methods) : one of the varieties of "responsibility."

But a cost of "responsibility" is that he has little time to explore — and may even be prohibited from exploring — the consequences or desirability of changes in other components for which he is not "responsible." Thus, there is tendency to identify the "probable" or "assured" states of other parts of the system as the current states (partly from ignorance, organisational caution, lack of time for contingency planning).

Thus, when "academic" evaluates counterforce as if NATO had adequate conventional capability, "responsible" bureaucrat may tend to evaluate counterforce as if current inadequacies could never or would never change.

Reid Adams: 19 Dec.

Azizad left the country for Geneva (with his wife) on 24 Oct., Wednesday, as blockade started.

He was convinced:

- a) SU would never put missiles in Cuba
- b) US was ~~trumping up~~ evidence, trying to provoke SU response.
- c) US was planning to strike first.

[Note: can't say this would have been the worst way to go first: SU was not alert, perhaps deliberately so. Nor was NATO.]

Thus, prob of war (US first strike) was about 90%.

[Note: Geneva was not so dumb under the assumption of a US first strike.]

Downer fact, 18 Dec. Thought prob of war was very high, though not 90%.

McNaughton: Devolution of authority from Pres is  
carefully measured.

"No" order must come from the highest authority.

But:

"Hitting them first, with the mostest" is absolute.

Hitting them too soon, with too much, may run directly  
counter to the national interest.

DE.

1. No Stop message prepositioned or authorized or potentially authenticated with bombers on airborne alert or Positive Control, for use after they have received a Go order (i.e., on the ground, or in the air after receiving a "Launch" order launching them on airborne alert or Positive Control).

Thus, in case SU suspends between initiation of US attack and arrival of bombers (e.g., after US missile arrival) — which might be 10-14 hours for most bombers — there is no way even to delay (or divert, re-target, or postpone or cancel) the major part, or any, of the bomber attack on the SU.

Solution: a) ~~Now~~ Put a "Cancel" message, in the Positive Control envelope, along with "Go" code. Study and develop procedures for re-directing bombers after they have received a "Go" order.

2. Have procedures relating to Execute messages,  
Positive Control, weapon safety, unauthorized action  
in planes, missiles and Command Posts, been  
studied in the Pacific Command as completely and  
comprehensively as in NATO, CONAD and SAC?

Two years ago, the answer was strong; No.

Procedures differed from one subordinate or  
GATOC command to the next; some were  
much less reliable than others. In general, the  
procedures affecting the young, junior officers flying  
F-100's alone were not nearly as careful as those  
relating to SAC bomber crews. E.g., they did not tell  
SAC, receive regular briefings on Positive Control procedures  
and sign statement that they understood (interviews  
showed dangerous uncertainties). Nor did they have  
an "irreversible code", not recently developed for  
SAC

"Resolution of rising expectation" → "resolution of rising demands" (willingness to die, buy, risk, threaten, force, to improve lot); Underdeveloped nations have problems that

PROBLEMS they didn't "have" (recognize as problems) before.

"It's not my problem" ("That's a real problem; I'm glad it's not mine.")

a) Concentric responsibility for sub-problems is one criterion ("That's his problem").

b) Or: refusal for bargaining partners to "recognize" certain problems: force effort to "solve" (time of "children").

c) Lack of alternatives or inability to pursue "problem-solving process" because of lack of time.

[Koosel: "This method is to be used only on problems that are unimportant or urgent."]

("I can't worry about that problem").

Issue: Is this a sufficient prob that I can achieve an acceptable solution (or, sufficiently better solution)

Foster:

In Cuba: don't underestimate importance of availability of landing craft.

[Is it 'good' for SU to acquire bigger second-strike capability?] If deterrent should then fail, damage would be higher.

d [Also, less deterrent of lesser-but-large SO 'prosecutions'. Alternative deterrents are possible, preferable, desirable - but they don't adequately exist today; and it would be irresponsible for US Pres to act in every respect and in every context as if they did exist. Those who would urge him

to do so - e.g. by adopting no-first-use-of-nuclear policy - often ignore such consequences as the effect of on NATO nations, incentives to develop independent national deterrents (which will not substitute either for conventional arms - to deter small aggression - nor for the US guarantee of first strike - to deter large aggression]

Foster: SC broke resistance a year ago; "We are  
objective enough to realize that history might not  
repeat itself; but we do regret now assume then  
a New year's resolution."

What is a "lie"? (as in were K's ninth class  
'lies'?)

Element of intent, consciousness.

Issue: what is the 'claim' to be evaluated?

What are words? Context? Audience(s)?

Consider prisoner<sup>of war</sup>, who makes a statement that he intends  
(hopes) to be interpreted in a particular way by an  
audience that has special knowledge (e.g. of his  
background, setting, goals, message), though it  
would be interpreted differently (in a way such that  
it would be false) by other, uninformed, "typical"  
audiences.

To what extent is the proposition a matter of fact,  
susceptible of being demonstrated to be "true" or "false"?

[<sup>"</sup>In war, truth is the first casualty.<sup>"</sup>]

Danger of relying on "expert analysis"

of "explaining man by machine" (program)

(numerical  
format):

that system will then be able to do only  
what we (designer) know how to explain to do  
know how to teach, analytically +  
systematically

know, diminishes importance of what we know

Intellectualization of President:

not just responsibility, complexity, uncertainty, exposure

but: Mysteries: actual knowledge } previously hidden, practices } guarded threats  
(What President has previously had?  
See? God Old War natural?)

"Political scientists" are prevented from knowing how the system operates, now — or in the past, since the secret is well kept (better than they can imagine — so they don't know extent of their ignorance, as they compare what they "know" now with what they "knew" about the past).

Difficulty of learning from "experts," or from "the incisive intellectual" (unbiased): (from someone "different").

What they don't know, condemns them.

disqualifies them

Psychologists, icons; psychologists; social scientists...

(Physical scientists, known to know "the secrets of the atom" (but they didn't get benefit of the doubt).

The bomb worked. True Believers, they).

[To learn, or listen to, someone who doesn't know what we know, diminishes importance of what we know]

Frederick Stone

Gordon Institute

Shannon-on-Hudson, N.Y.

914

RO-2-0700 (Westchester  
County)

Harold Kuhn

Dept of Mathematics

Princeton University

Princeton, N.J.

11 Aug 64

Interim Report 15 Aug 64

① explore

[By studying differences between war zones and reality]

Big stake, both us catchalls.

In real zones

some

1) Command levels at or near normal.

or below

2) Effects of power, trust, responsibility; publicity  
real rather than.

[In practice

error

4) Commitment, predictions, warnings.

5 Political opposition cities

6) Internal resistance { survey

{ confrontation

{ high but negativity

Exhibit

2. "History that is pertinent to the problems of the operator."

Focus on mechanism and process rather than outcome

alone; on the form in which events presented themselves

in

to those in command responsibility; with all the

confusions, behind allies, unknowns, ambiguities presented

Actual history is not always difficult, but is deeply subjective. Don't

lead on to ambiguity for and repeat complexity,  
ambiguity, ...

1. Commanders' Dearts:

↳ More advice, given by only trust and desire.

↳ Less of when they have to allocate listening time  
clearly - Communication.

↳ Desire to work in privacy, by phone or face-to-face.

[Why was it important to see K-C often?]  
Was "communication" a real problem in Cuban crisis?  
Was problem one of explaining or convincing of  
K's understanding of his belief?

[Was it useful to convey caution to K, as distinct  
from being cautious? I thought not to rationalize caution though.]

the world Tolentino knew of Pan participation?

SG?

Role of SI?

Differences with USSR,

"no record of the issue rising above the level of the Dif and Under Sec State." CC

Why did Brown back Sanchez, instead of Chamorro?

Where were French?

Why State upholds a negotiated settlement?

Forces needed; so many in charge of forces  
hard to be supported; and he in conflict  
<sup>+ U.S. + France</sup>  
with non State wanted to support ... Military and soldiers  
(Two sets of "good guys")



Demand

12092, 22 Oct

1. Cuba: DEFCON 3 message sent out in chain, 5 hours ahead of speech — to go to 3 at time of speech. Are EAP geared to US weapons, rather than to US-initiated actions?

[Riley's message, 75X to CINCS, criticized as departure from procedures, too limited in detail.  
But...!]

(Johnson also criticizes!)

2. Cuban Planning Group role (2 Oct?)  
Johnson Task Force

3. Why did JCS meet in Gold Room instead of NMCC?

4. Real possibility of operating from alternate site? Problems?

5. Possibility of a) SODs for crisis ops

b) "Panels" of cleared people.

6. Are there really, crisis EAPs? Plans for messages, identifying?

20 Oct Fighting began between Chinese + Indian troops

22-23 Oct Generic aircraft attacked Asian territory  
and Oct 1 presence of Egyptian troops on Germ admitted.  
3 Nov first strand of US arms to Asian arrived.

7 Effort of very 550 clowns for communism!

Wilson had : manage traffic, J-3, com files  
+ interviews

Look of access of WSEG Studies:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. White House                         | } meetings telecons<br>across informal netwgs<br>agency EO cables<br>letters Pres.-foreign letters<br>drafts Dip. contacts; numerous<br>working papers Dip. |
| 2. JCS                                 |   |
| 3. NSC                                 |   |
| 4. SG                                  |   |
| 5. USIS                                |   |
| 6. COMINT, etc.                        |   |
| 7. OSD                                 |   |
| 8. State                               |   |
| 9. CIA DDP                             |   |
| 10. Diplomatic; Conference             |   |
| 11. Anticommun.                        | OIC, OAS, INR<br>CIA memos<br>Confidential minutes  |
| 12. SI ; and traffic own 550 channels. |   |
| 13. T, K ; COMINT, SG ops.             |   |
| 14. All over Int'l. bulletins          |   |

W507 : Steffey view

1. Independent members of:

a. Press corps.

b. Broadcast Corp.; org. SEC, etc.

c. Info available to the Estimator, SI, T, K, CIB, CL

Diff., letters, telecs

d. Selected motives, considerations (e.g. election campaign)

e. Personal views, pressures

f. Personal, states.

g. News & policies by City Council acting; Pres., etc.

h. Initial influence of intelligence, press process.

i. Court of process.

(5107, 6022 questions are now visible.)

In Laos:

On Dec. 13, 1960, the <sup>t</sup> ~~lawless~~ <sup>is agent</sup> Laos were supporting the  
"legal" government of Laos, and we were recently supporting  
a rebel movement. When ours took over, we couldn't get  
allies (except Thailand, RVN & China) to recognize it!

Why went France more active? Who won the forces?

Dec. 13 - Laos received US - armament - variety from Reds.

List errors for countries

CAS

Role of CAT, airborne, They ; B-26, T-6,

Action of Long Le - a CAS favorite - similar to

actions of RVN special troops w. Buddhists, who? you?

How did election change influence?

Description of allies? (their knowledge of coup?)

Any surprises?

A A A A

athletic of Maryland

What is French & British war in future of coalition  
with pro-communist in it?

Plane suggested of country to run a separate Southern Route!

Had been studying the Geneva Accords

Despatched Constitution, etc.

Both sides right proper? Two split of country

"Attack" by "VM - class" reaching to PLG, and  
accused by world press had to be countered  
by us (considered) — (even if phony?) just as  
Tenten Gulf Incident had to be countered, to save  
of prestige.

Parallel: PLG class of VM, UC

Tidy class of flight to Syria

Other class of low numbers

7

5

Why didn't we move up by its effect of class?

Form of DRR - PRC intervention?

[Technique? Find out what on private world say;  
then get one, if not.]

<sup>in Jan '61</sup>  
Was there a decision to give DDP major responsibility  
for summarizing plan in China & Korea?

(Nagel, Ciech, Mikkola?)

State - purely diplomatic, political issues

DDP - purely military

CIA - purely covert

} ?

↳ agent's agency, short-term problem-solving  
level

- ↳ major cases, minor risks & mistakes not from  
interactions or transmission; wrong, or different,  
as well as from decisions, judges' performance
- ↳ costly questions, evaluating planning, preparation &  
activities, attorney risky info-gathering, making  
statements (protecting evidence, finding goals) of  
by individuals at the top.

How improves their performance, their direction?  
Secondly follows how does this affect?

Because treated by a politician, or another  
with broad responsibilities (not a bureaucrat).

and: responsibility to pass on info., upon

Challenges to centralization:

1) Separation of powers

mission? with decentralization;

acts, norm not given, goals not given (with central role).

rights, etc. not given (with federal model).

2) Central powers with decentralization (Italy: zone, conflict)

Decentralization?

Violence, conflicts in control, disregard, initiation

(Guyana, Chile, (U.S.), Jordan, Libya, (Bulgaria))

3) Day - not team  
Government as an ideal  
(for short as well),  
now, fast, simple

Political costs of calculating, asking, ready,  
Planning

factor in conflict - motivations

+ weak lack of institution

Effects of decision process on responsibility

↳ clearly stated goals, to

ad: responsibility to pass on info, inform

Cause & Effect Form

Cause = the Health of the Patient

Effect = acute Deteriorating

Commander Events - (the last want to reveal - )

3)

Examination

perfect nose shape

Sent History

Quality of command

Answers - later

Review + Description - Holmes

by new evidence  
Study

THE END OF THE PAPER

<sup>auto</sup>  
Power: 402-294X-4111

Col. A. A. Murphy

curr. card  
986-62992 H15

1. If war comes, it will come out of a crisis.  
It's first a war committee, war to policies,  
and secondly decisions are largely home  
based.

Thus, attention to quality of decision-making  
in crisis  
& control of message & war.

Crisis management: why - enough of a  
crisis?

Management of a message, and actions as messages  
to: convince, teach, persuade, front  
by: the President, the trusted, informed advisor

This, difference of deployment, etc.,  
Also: a cognitive problem: i.e. in press, informed  
narrative, informed  
a political problem: a following; a test.

VI

E 3

Actual:

Crisis as Failure. is Det.

Crisis as Surprise. Surprise → pre-existing →  
no prediction, without → failure.  
Because pre-existing position of other system, self. others  
already  
Crisis as Dialogue. Multi-dimensional Dialogue of needs.

Direction, Balance, Trends. Equilibrium. Multi-dimensional.

Crisis as Limit Conference. Last resort.

Crisis as Model of the Possibility. Pro info; Pro  
motors; Pro background.

Internal memory. Internal conflict. Broken mirror.

Underpinnings of 1) Capital theory

2) Non-Demand, Non-Demand

3) Design theory

4) Org. theory. (Over over measuring)

ACTIVATION / INTEGRATION - OR

Authority &

Dif. between coercive threat and

coercive promise of guilt + anxiety.

$A \Rightarrow B$

i) B if A (or C) can make B feel guilty for making threats against A or even, failing to comply with A's wishes.

ii) B will (under form of guilt) admit to a "mediation/education/legitimation" process that will bring the guilt feelings under control of (symbolic) power. Regulation (intended by) A (or C) is now to be accepted/delayed or threaten B.

3) As consequence of i & ii : A can create anxiety for B but B cannot create anxiety for A  
that is result of great disparity in power.

A S T U V W X Y Z

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R

Excitation is stability of a feedback process.

as control system where output is the  
Disturbance (or input? design invariant?)  
(change export structure?) to another  
control system.

Together, we have a joint conflict system  
where stability (say, to the 1 party, or another,  
or bimimetic, perhaps? "disturbances")

Col Morgan, ESD Decision Theory

Crisis Management

Crisis Response

President

Step 1: Assess & Plan  
Step 2: Implement Plan - → supports - → answer

unethical questions

With

Set better questions from President:

a) To the

b) Primary

c) Failure

What do the social sciences contribute to understanding?

- Understanding of geo-heterogeneity - address with known

components

- Emergence in crisis

Know Thyself: See yourself as others see you

First comes the place at Big Room;  
the parties on both sides have stepped  
aside; the citizen went passing; the  
white shelter; the trees behind protect, and  
this move toward a comfortable house a  
narrow, central street.

Oppression wins. For your time, striking securities  
will be paid off, now. In this city, there is already  
the difficulty of office says to integrate the  
role of the President; carrying out of policies,  
any conflict with the participation of ours, he  
needs to act, say, for instance, that; he must close  
the small fractions of USC office  
But in this, the two cannot command.

International Organization close management is required —  
coordinated fast action — committee needed.

Policies must be changed (e.g., change conditions);

rights must be brought — taken, signature obtained,

violent action planned + conducted —

Ps as qualified but the Pres; by authority,  
by legislation, by example and depth of responsibility  
He will want his judgment to be controlling ...

Ps as crisis manager. Ps can manage it for him.  
Extraordinary times. Convolutions:

Division of authority we have about crises ...  
One man; 2 symbols, a "divine" of the time,  
fighting characteristics of crises, in fact to limit  
ability of one human representation to control, to judge  
ourselves, in real situations, when there is  
after surprise without plan.

If war comes, it will consist of a crisis -- which  
as a result of a crisis, of "war" disseminating  
in a crisis situation of urgent need, the in which  
early violent action towards situation

How to avoid wars.

How to prepare for them.

Has to know them ("technical way")

How to act wisely as might when they occur.

Known about in an  
attempt to understand of crisis phenomena. How  
and where & why do the wars; how an crisis  
arising, how to the choice of different action  
intervene, under what condition does this intervention  
be at, which has it up to?

First type: social unrest, not to power.

Second type: territorial demands.  
In case of the choices are facilitated, the various  
form of leadership behavior: understanding + prediction  
of facilitated choices. (P.M.H.)

Crisis type as an object of scientific analysis, the  
this phenomenon is a complex entity; it is at the  
heart of several layers of ignorance; it is a  
conflict in itself in a middle with no signs. The  
outer surface is the powers of the intervention of

Several large businesses acting upon me.

There is complex & mysterious ways; of one of them, we know to be a "Black Box", whose inner structure and processes are concealed from us. Our work will tell us more.

That is inevitable. The inner darkness is the shadow of our own burgeoning — sharply, in national strength, making in the last generation of Old Men, of Industrial oligarchs, consumers of conflict & challenge & innovation. It is in other Black Boxes. But the heart of darkness is the hubman of the President — despite the fact that of course

#### a) Authority

Fake or Black Box. Only part of info, only part of authority; almost nothing of powers.

Protection of our foreign influence.

Our inner shadow is used when the anti-free intervention, individual projects, great projects (big, with no comment), etc.

*Answers to Prof. S.*



But she has no right to  
"criticize." That is for me; the teacher should be  
"the learner."

Result: a) her prediction of his attack, attempt to  
get self; poor planning, attempt  
b) her prediction of by any factor of  
distance, sufficiency of time concern — concern  
energy.

However, poor prediction of my prediction.

Answer, several incorrect statements:

a) I opposed and interfered with nothing.

b) Clothes is inefficient, we are so inefficient.

c) His more skill comes as he uses more skill.

c) we will be unprepared to expel.

## Effects of survey.

(a) End for social control ]

b) End for staff follow-up

c) End for staff understanding of interpretation  
of group behavior; time, money, preparation

d) End of info. What is it the needs?

End of breaking news. Crisis work.

Start of long haul. (with no tidy agenda)

Staff problem is to prepare answers to  
(unasked, anticipated) questions;

But questions are (too) confrontive.) ]

a) Lack of feedback from (staff +) third parties  
(clients, etc.)

b) End understanding by affirmative allies,  
of staff + others

c) End satisfaction of efforts/effort prediction,  
behavior of the major dictated, but based partly

on what to face that staff don't see.]

implications for several variables:

1) Decisions can be eliminated - no reduced risk

Int: 2) Its effects can be better understood

3) Est. effects can be reduced; less surprise

4) Some, but not all, judgments become

available; more search for hypotheses.

5) Less sensitivity can be a price of success.

6) Other can study, in some sensitive settings,  
mentoring behavior; suggests high-level decision-making  
in large organizations.

X Com. Dimension

a) Strong hierarchy

b) Decency

c) Staffs, middle level out, etc.

Was there a question of buying something? A crisis?  
Planning? Why not? What if same, or similar, but  
one set of the blue without green marks, or writing?  
Who drew the lines; and why?

Plots: over and over again it made lots of ground  
changes by knowing their reports inaccurate  
or wrong

Two classical mistakes to avoid in estimating invasion:

- 1) neglect or wishful minimization of evidence because it doesn't fit a priori hypothesis.
- 2) heavy reliance on one or two sources (not many hypotheses, giving weight of evidence, giving opinion?)

(There was a strong alternative hypothesis — post experience, + practice, both suggested a stepping-place to the military process — though not necessarily short of IL-28's or FROG's, traps; not much there, contingent on the rest of what they would provoke a US military reaction.) [Would they? If war in imminence — what did not specify military actions.]

Were IL-28's, SAMs a test? I mean did show something to SAMs — deliberate, known effect — what might have been many? but we did nothing, except <sup>defensive</sup> attack, counter.

Meriolos

[Text] B left much for him that US would  
and weapons reported to be aggressive in purpose  
out of a more "offensive" manner.

[Paraphrasing that they might use words this  
way meant to say that the words they were using  
did not constitute a clear assurance.

Why didn't you act? Some believe they  
didn't believe there was a real chance.

Third another would indicate a far greater willingness  
to increase the level of risk in US-Sov relations than  
the USSR has displayed thus far.

[Refutes the amount of risk the USSR  
estimated; i.e. their estimate of JFK's crisis behavior;  
one est. assumes they would see risk high if this is  
a prediction.]

## Great-Power Disruption

Hard to conceal from great power; easier to achieve, when

( $\frac{1}{10}$ ) about timing, precise target, purpose

(which affects other actions taken or avoided simultaneously)

or subsequently, actions of allies supported or opposed!

Why disrupt? If it is necessary, that suggests the  
existence of major cross-conflict

Call on Report to FBI:

- a) MCC is just patently suspicious?
- b) MCC was always for more cover - everywhere.  
(argued on Oct 7 - had no real evidence of such).
- c) Interdepartmental official group on aeros intel.

DTI fact 1

1) American General Arms had practice of  
deterring or greater + alteration of flights for month, the  
attempt to consider more (not until 10/11) the greater had  
been blown - even though total wks of flights might run into  
the next month, because of bad weather.

On 10 Sept, they at particularized DTI - because  
of weather constraints etc - was not completed TII flight of  
10/11. This it was directed to finding intent of DTI;  
these already found were not blown over again.

The indications of TIIOTC available after mid-Sept were not  
such as to make specific investigation seem necessary  
now?; although suspicious area indicated on flights  
around Oct 10 (mainly to reflect S-4 over eastern)

Scenes: 1 committee on Central Recon in CIA

2) Meetings of Cuban Committee from 20th by Andy  
Nitzsche (?) State

3) Foreign liaison in State

4) SWC Oct. 19

5) First half of Pres speech night of Oct 19

6) Macmillan letter to JFK 22 Oct. State

7) Reasons for Delays in - Simpson

- Johnson

8?

Conclusions (Oct 13; 24683) State

- - - - -

- - - - -

One made it to Siberia, saying US would not  
intervene.

18. The name of Storkov - large film night of 19 Oct?

[An instant of flight before reentry, + 7.16 provision]

[This made analysis of effects of mines?]

? What if 0-2 had been shot down? What  
Planning for this, Oct 16-28? What was real  
from our failure to shoot? The other was manage  
to land 16-22, if flight thought to be?



10. What discussion, Tuesday evening Oct 16?

Who did you talk to between 9 and 11:45?

Eating, eating time? Who? Who is locomotives,

II? What reward?

2.  
-

11. Who did "invited" visitors? Body -

12. What were early attitudes of Epiphany on the  
remaining puzzles of creation? Re deception? So  
expectations? Relation to politics, the Nation?

13. What ultimate relation offered only e.g. intell  
Crown, to cover failure?

[32 Oct: comes via - very very difficult]

6. Who was told Oct 14 - early? Who told him why?

Who was not told, who was told even stronger?

Who was told at liberty?

When, during evening?

7. Who was in? by accident of timing, however?  
fellow?

Did no one besides M.G. want to talk to Pres? Did  
they know he didn't know?

7. What were their first reactions - Oct 15? What  
should they do? Who did they tell? Any anti-war, peace  
to expand on this?

8. What or who phoned Oct 16? night Pres does not want this  
Oct 15?

22, 29, 35, 36

20, 28, 36

1. What other advantages were for SC are being  
regarded as unlikely because 'too costly' -  
because of other pressures underlying those estimates?]

2. Other info on Committee on Standardization? Who, what?

What was our planning in case of incidents?

Are ops worldwide coordinated - special  
con to avoid incidents when an important operation  
is going on?

3. Was flight 10 initially scheduled because of 3 Porte d'Asnières?  
Was flight recalled? When minutes considered?

4. What did Bureau build for invest. of 1980's which was  
(McC's version?)

1. When were first C.G.I. instruction on flats implemented?

2. Who was responsible for the implementation?

Also it is important to the survey of 15-22 Oct that  
special group was attached already to affairs  
as also because of political considerations?

- 3rd v, Oct 12 - 82.

Question for Economic What was the effect on U.S.  
dissemination of information, restriction of price  
increases?

How could he have reduced his costs? Reduced  
masses? What would have been effects of this? [  
Suppose he had known of movement of  
inflation in 80? What would he have done?]

## Crisis, Decision + Response

I am upholding emotion as an effect not a cause; this introduces consideration ignored in the "decision" approach, which does not ask Why the alternatives, categories values are seen as they are, or how/why they change.

The emotional response is not, altogether, closed deliberately (though it may be demanded, & the extent to which it is revealed or explained may be controlled) and it is the effects response variables in some ways "uncontrolled by the ego" — i.e. not closed — not adopted to conscious goals & expectations of future consequences.

Anxiety, depression  
Anger, fear, hatred (from humiliation!) effect values and expectations, closed behavior, situations perceived, + considered, goals, etc. — in ways not explicit, conscious, or "closed."

Anger may also be useful, and be used; it can be deliberately incurred, or be triggered.

This, not all effects of the "info that produces emotion"

can be described as thus of Peleg's Theorem.

Important parts of governmental response  
of course "chosen" or "decided" by highest officials  
(though someone may have "decided" them; but of these,  
important parts may not have been "decided" by  
anyone.  
(e.g. high officials may have determined or selected  
them — without using a process of "decision".)

Contract is to the "team" approach — which assumes  
common (organization) motives, models (though  
different evidence and action-responsibilities).

(Unintentionally, one sees less focus on motives, or  
splits in goals/values/models between "politically responsible  
officials" and bureaucrats.

Do Presidents influence gov response — in ways  
not determined by the bureaucracy, or public, explicit  
priorities defining the "national interest" before the event?

Ministers costs of calculation, travel, study, etc  
as units in "national planning"

It focus on costs in the form of political costs,  
risks, dangers, rather than economic costs.

Costs of calculability, considering, accepting /producing/  
presenting, "being informed"; [e.g. responsibility to  
pass on info] of certain kinds, & from certain sources — to  
others with different models, goals ; here, purpose is  
some cases for "not being told ; not knowing" (of  
information; or, of info that would be misinterpreted, or would  
lead to "bad" resulting beliefs, & persons for action).

Effects of "claim process" on responsibility :  
potential challenge, criticism

### Ignorance is an Expense

(e.g. for not informing others — Congress, public,  
Others; not "passing on info.")

Plans-ends (i.e. retros-congruous-values)  
Final objectives

But means ends approach, starting with goals/ends (like "problem-solving," "costal approach") lead initially to consideration of means for solutions, means; where "decision" approach issues mean given, emphasizes evaluation of them, rather than invention, discovery, search.

However, means approach does suggest a stand for goals/values/ends, as far as to claim; i.e. as a basis for comparison and choice. System analysis.

Whence means-ends may come ends given, totally specified in advance, unchanging.

## Presidential Rule

Alternative justifications.

- 3) To mediate disputes, define ends, evaluate ends, and choose policies / programs, without reference & constraint of Administration / party / personal interests.
- 4) To increase / maintain power and influence of nation (to achieve goals largely defined elsewhere: bureaucracy, public, Congress, former party, party)
- 5) to maintain his Administration in office (anticipating) and his own place in history, and his own current prestige and influence).

B K

- Internal War      Ed. Harry Eckstein      Free Press 64  
Political Power      <sup>OS/1959</sup> Eysenck & Huntington      Viking 64  
Russia 3603      V. Montgomery Hyde      Farer-Stran.  
Korea - The Limited War      Daniel Rees      St. Martin's, 64  
British Politics in the Suez Crisis      Ch. Ill. P. E. Epstein

## Fair Decisions and Decency

Motives for Decency:

(1) keep government from committing itself to commitments which he will then have to carry out.

(2) might have to commit himself if he (as is public) knows of more — because of his position, his public & allies' attitude. He might be encouraged to do so by belief that we are unlikely to make more money, either (U.S. vs. K. in Sept '62), by political benefits of being tough about military contingencies, or (3) may be trade with warlords, to compensate for softness now), or belief we are highly unlikely to do it given his warning (the re. English, see re K; K was blasted in Sept '62, etc?)

Or, he might be obliged to pass info on, of "definite", "immediate" or "specific" — to others who would then take counteraction or press him to take action.

(So, whence him of this responsibility: English think w/ K vs. JFK in Sept '62; Glavin re. warning of an attack to K? Glavin re. telling Hitler early?)

✓

Weightage given on planning.

Some reasons for appearance of class:

- 1) Complexity of motives : different sets + weightings at different times, places.  
(+ different weightings by different people, with  
different perspectives and obligations)
- 2) Gov. can't claim fully all motives or info —  
even within gov.
3. Different motives relating to policy statements : different  
in multiple motives, different circumstances.
4. 4. Effect of controversy, difference of opinions, bureaucratic  
parties, opposition,  
Resistants. (Tamil & Chal)  
Prior commitments, policies.

t.

56

Eastern Central Politics & the May Crisis

May

convention

1. Eden had been main figure in policy set of base in 1954 - joint opposition of May Group in his own party. (Had this been generated by last trots meeting in Jan 1954?)
2. Did not pass over - right after trots moved out - tried to discredit Eden's policy; vindicate his opposition; specifically, indicating "cautious" or "trusting" policy was wrong and encouraged "defiance." "But cooperation, in general, Britain must hope to obtain by China from Egypt. It was in this prospect that Eden now of Korea?" stated some of
3. Eden - the UK is 62 (France - 50, or not?) was reported of being indecisive and sufficiently interested to the goals served by intervention.
4. The "protection" was seen as an opportunity by the May Group: to topple De Gaulle, ~~that~~ regain control, reconstitute

British action in ME & independence of US,  
winter period role.

First as there was opportunity to invade  
Ala, Teller Castro (missed by SEC; first as  
other fully standard is opportunity.)

But - no time even opportunity to shift  
foreign policy, now, called for by VSC-63.  
And a Pearl Harbor was opportunity.

4. The Sec. like J.C. (or James?) knew that more  
would have strong support of an otherwise separationist  
group (in his party; SEC-in October); and would  
increase foreign criticism of him. at least temporarily.  
(While SEC, the knew strong party was  
possible, and some hints of it were

This "provocation" was many agents in America  
writing for an "increase." (Actually, lack of statement  
writing, but others were).

5. To have failed to use "stability" to more  
widely — and implicitly, in my view) would have  
exposed him on the U.S.R. (Tunisian?) to  
sharp attack; "revealed" inaccuracy & weakness,  
tellt of charges against him.

(Ex of Pgs, 21m)

6. Style & nature of provocation — which bi-credited  
policy of anti-existing leader — was seen as effrontery,  
defiance ("impudence") — infuriating, and  
humiliating, and damaging to prestige and influence  
in the eyes of third parties.

(Also: Cold bully, inst. by — Murdoch)  
(Also: Tunis, or League of Arab States in general:  
"These bastards! They can't be that to me!"  
Tunis fully believed been misled — by others?/  
by his intelligence?)

Cuba

7. the bone of your : a correctly prior knowledge  
(of French attack); (also collusion, ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> loyalty)  
a idea — of being total friends by well you, &  
well into a war.

- a) deceiving people is to plan, actions.
- b) deceiving is not country themselves.
- c) not tell; Palme is all of Stuart (by of pigs, they  
not care in US?)

(Role of Congress in Korea? role of session?)

8. [Is Dick Etan know of prospective Dallas withdrawal of  
support of Dan? Ericka Childers, Bad to bad,  
161-62, 191.]

loyal.

8. Difference: lack of organized political opposition  
in the US case & Cuba I + II, Korea. What might  
have produced it in US?

Plan opposition in US is Democrats, not in Republicans  
in Cuba. Still, why not more criticism?

9. Revision: What were USSR's expectations? Why did he  
think he could get away with it? (as K + other  
states).

10. Role of elections. Randolph Churchill, *Air + Sea* f  
Sir Anthony Eden, London 1953, p. 293. Britain thought  
she would be preoccupied with election, or worried  
about affording French voters. Thought American opinion  
would swing from "benign neutrality" to "hostile  
neutrality." (Chairman recognized.) They stayed.

11. Cost of first assault: to be severely committed (by attention) before US or British (Cabinet, PAF, labor) opposition could see and act, attempting to commit itself, to later move; & often strongly. (First assault is going first move; first commitment is, against internal & Iwoj. opposition).

But it didn't get "credit" for being committed - opposition (Labor; SCL & Cba) acted despite minuscule commitment by initiator; but because they had committed themselves earlier, and open move looked like defiance of their supposed desire.

12. Phenomenal refusal of Gen. MacArthur to come free - forcing it to withdraw before Comd. Braden (+ others, to sit before attack succeeded) - instead of neatly successful attack is better than US wrongful failure - even if worse than no attack).

[On days of activity:  
When smalls

26 May

W on. Agitating recons: Germany is headed by the  
Allied gov. involved, because of the anticipation of  
the reaction of their governments public

(particularly - the fear of enemy patrols, incidents.)

The, Indian gov. flights over Hindooon forces.

Foreign gov did know of nature of flights, contrary  
to what Hitler told Congress.

(Initially prepared to be open to charge of  
not knowing, then to charge of knowing.

[Flight Custer done claimed lack of knowledge.]

Distrb. 18.8 ft. : rate of 1 ft. 7.8 ft., required 15.2 ft.

resident of Name (A) will your contracts may be fulfilled  
officials in the railroad industry.

and para 1 (4) 2:3

1. A large zone or District has arrived either a winter...  
is being guarded by the troops.

(45 cent. It is believed that ground forces will  
could effectively control so an update area a zone as large  
as the one cited above.)

2. Plantation guarded; went activity; said to be miners.



Carroll: given the box, it took high-level attention to get  
outside of normal publication channels to get agency  
banned up the line.

[There were analysts to pass on the info, if  
not, e.g. in the Cuban Daily Bumby — would carefully  
in DCI's office. ?]

(Everyone conscious of need to be able to explain,  
if there was a mishap, the justification for the flight  
in terms of highest priority needs.)

Recounted report (Hansen) received by analysts 28 Sept,  
and relayed to  
Hansen 27 Sept. Next, 1 Oct, convey.

report C-3  
1 Oct, report down., reader passed to Hansen 9 or 10 Sept.

These triggered triggery process. Flight selected was  
that material in report of 8 Sept; not much attention had  
been paid to this at time, finally became DCI/P justification  
of report <sup>were</sup> paragraph reporting closed area was 4.

But, with other three reports...

Issue # 11  
2/27: May induction

NO we could have gotten it eight weeks or ten  
days earlier, but Carroll advised, would what you could have  
gotten a week or ten days earlier have been enough to  
convince anybody — but at the trouble we had convincing  
people with what we got on the 14th.

Elton said he felt the Red Line on still. victory

Well we have got nothing to be afraid of even if we do  
have a SNIS we can't buy. This isn't first doesn't  
let us put our best foot forward.

on Chellist  
After all, we didn't put major efforts on the Chellist or the C.R.

MI-62889 Cell # 4  
2/70 - Ontario

[Was a secret weather plan postponed?  
Were high-level resources mobilized for White House?  
Available to CIA?]

Hillman: The whole group was fearful of another U-2 incident - early October. Everybody was about to see another by yet slot know, but she was anxious to avoid jeopardizing the approval to fly U-2s, which might well have depended on the heels of a public uproar. Carter also seemed saw difficult it had been to obtain approval of the U-2s from Taylor; and thought him, from the President. Also, there were plans to use U-2s in the Far East, which would need approval.

TB, people at lower levels had used to be cautious themselves, but they had the approval at higher levels.]

4 Oct. DCI at SG [Lang] found for in every  
of eastern Abn, stated that CS was being restricted  
to the suburbs only. The AG was quite provoked and  
claimed that there had been no requirement submitted  
for the western end, and that at no time had the  
PAs or the SG turned down any flights CS asked for.  
It is felt it was him that the opportunity to  
overfly in the face of SAMs was lost.

A flight plan approved on 9th. This flight was  
intended to discover if the SAMs were operational. The  
flight plan was laid out to cover the two most advanced  
and if these were not operational, then they would go  
for thorough coverage of eastern Abn later. On  
the next mission, the PAs, along the 9th, were  
but withheld approval for the next mission until the  
results of the 14th. were known.

The SAC pilot, new to the area, got lost and  
was converted and only by residents overflew the  
Imperial area. He was forced to turn around  
to the east of where he should have been with the  
overflew the MRBNs.

29 Oct: Wet good. Flight canceled for NE passing, poor weather; other planes over side of lines.

7 Oct. All other - good. flight over NE passing.

Completed left mission; Oct missions not yet authorized

8-11 Oct: Flts with not authorized

[Any question?]

29 Oct: no weather check (?)

31 Aug - 4 Sep " " " (as left missions not authorized)

W: On 10 Sept an ad hoc mission by the SG & RWD's office drew a flight plan for a single mission to cover the bulk of what COMOR asked on 5 Sept.

Subsequently, RWD studied this single mission at 4 times. 4 many days had to be found. Consequently, to fly all together 4 aircrafts went off.

Weather had to be present good (0.5 over) at

~~20th~~ time of the - no 2nd mission, 12 hours before takeoff

These scheduled missions cancelled because of poor ( $3/8 - \frac{1}{2}$  over) to bad weather over areas of desired coverage: 2 ft I, 17, 22, 28, Oct 2; or on 1st. I found target (sites of fires) observed.

[~~After~~ if Standdown after loss of flight over China  
on 8 Oct till 16 Sept] I

Between 16 Sept and 14 Oct, weather poor to bad  
over targets for at least 18 of the 32 days.

Out optimum airflight conditions between 16 - 24 Oct  
(one of best weather ever observed in Area).

Sept 7 planned for southwest China; cancelled for poor  
weather.

16 Sept: West-good; Central + East-poor. Flight alerted;  
delayed by poor weather over targets in Eastern China.  
Cancelled 17 Sept.

26 Sept: West-good, East-good. Flight over  
SE-China, China.

27 Sept: West-good; 28.

The sensitivity attached, after early left, to the presence of offensive weapons systems in Cuba had the effect of requiring a higher grade of proof in order to demonstrate to policy-makers that a major surveillance change had taken place in the Soviet arms build-up.

[Who wrote this? Evidence?]

[Higher grade would have been necessary, say, on Aug 25?]

The numerous reports of offensive missile activity for a long period prior to the beginning of the arms build-up, none of which had been substantiated and many of which had been disproved, induced skepticism among intelligence analysts of subsequent reports of such missiles, especially in absence of photo confirmation.

[Is report ever taken less seriously as evidence than if (a) there had not been earlier reports & analysis (b) no earlier opportunity to check & disprove reports by photos.]

## Tentative Conclusion of Interim Report

- Int. com's somewhat tardy awareness of the offensive threat was reflected by the absence of requirements specifically targeted against this particular threat (except for 33rd Treaty - 14 Oct mission).
- SI gave initial air reports & forecast of an invasion, but did not seem to disclose the intention. [role of S1? ] or action in deploying missiles.
- (Reference: 144 photos (except IT-22); went across widely different geographical areas, intell from coverage of DC (except IT-22 training).
  - Int: refugees; agents (about 100 over months);
  - Photos - though program not pursued with adequate vigor during development period of 2 months to provide coverage of 11 parts of the island at sufficient frequency.

Stone Report: first major report received with  
affirmative missile animal sent 6 Sept,  
first MRBM not moved to site sent  
17 Sept.

Pictures of I-28 cuts of 23 2 ft took 12 days to  
reach Washington. Annexed I-28 prints seen in Wash.  
15 Oct. IRBM site 15 Oct.

Rest and of Alex not photographed between 27 Aug  
and 14 Oct. (6 weeks?)

And two leopard to bird from west to east.

[Suppose clouds had covered west end of  
island on 29 Aug + 5 Sept. Then east + vertical  
SAMs would have been seen first, attention turned  
to west. If, if flight had been delayed till,  
say, 20 Sept [the worse weather on west end  
+ 2 ft?] we would have seen MRBM — before  
reports!]

(But we wouldn't have seen any SAMs till 20-22 Sept  
+ sat.)

Procedures adopted in 2st delayed photo intel.  
but the delay was not critical, because photos obtained  
prior to alert 17 Oct - [?] would not have been  
sufficient to warrant action of a type which  
would require support from Western Hemisphere or  
NATO Allies.

[Might it have saved our justification for  
a fact example?]

14. What may set of requirements for strike? [M.N.J.  
Sgtz?]

150 sorties, 10 hours for M.R.O.P., + 100 sorties for airfields,  
+ 200 for SAMs. 200 sorties, 1400 hours for invasion.]

X

[Thought K planned to come to NY, ON late in November —  
after Russian election; K thought only at that time  
would be useful. G instructed to make clear  
that G and to also was ready for full participation  
to the defensive capability of Cuba.]

JFK: news to G was having a profound impact on  
American people & Congress. G mentioned Edg. of Big

Carat in the big crowd told K that was a mistake,  
and that had he been asked he would have given  
assurance there would be no further invasion attempt.

But once fully informed, G's attitude  
had changed. G: G.W. specialists were doing training in  
battle centers and of defensive war — and he wanted to train

18 Oct. front GMAC-JAE/C-NDC liaison.

MRSMs could be landed within 5 hours

18 Oct. DCI asked USIB to consider their reaction to

three possible courses of action:

- 3) To do with short effen. missions  
is also  
4) To do with blockade under direction of war  
Military action to destroy members and vessels Cuban

SNIE 11-18-62 (18-19.5d)

5 Oct } proposed mission  
7 Oct }

{ 5 Oct: USIB memo to C-2 flts. primary objectives on a north

{ 9 Oct 3G (Arg) wished to supply a SAM site in western  
Cuba

Ref to treat of 14 Oct.

(5 Oct: "CIAOR messages informed us that aircraft in  
light of the SA-2 and MIG-21 aircraft present there,  
but it must be stated that the current need  
is extremely urgent and the risks involved  
should be very thoroughly weighed before this  
course is chosen."

9 Oct: 3G (Arg) discussed option of downing. First priority  
to one C-2 over western end. If no fire, similar  
actions.

[How close was this decision? What  
if it had drawn fire?]

10-12 considered. 12 Oct: initial forward to SAC,

18, 19 17 Oct SMC 11-17-62 drafted

19-8 ft: SG arrived prepared on bus. altitude (for  
Buses. noted that leading light went this  
considered till results of CH flights available.

20-9 ft: weather checked daily for flight. cancelled.

17-9 ft: fkt over Buses: land cover.

18-21: delayed, cancelled.

22-26: delayed, flown on 26: Buses

27-8 ft: SG found CH forecast for one mission &  
Oct, + any 3rd flight not yet flown (4 flights  
remain under forecast drafted).

29-Sept: Sale of Pines, Cg of Pigs.

29-30ct: fuel plan, wind speeds, cancelled.

& mission. Land cover.

3 Oct: DH runs to COMOR: suspect HADM was. COMOR Daytrip

4 Oct: SG (Aug) + DCI said CH activated to vary 4-20  
& SE quadrant because of SAMs. This limited  
but greater behind. DCI justified.

NAD to present program for 11 noon to SG (Aug)  
on 9 Oct.

[1. What was mission planned by CIA originally?  
Was it planned for 6 flights, despite bad weather?  
" " " 10 flights " " incidents?  
Why was special meeting called for 10 flights? incidents?

2. Failure: lack of precision by intell. commun.  $\Rightarrow$  flights for  
more flights or coverage of west end.  
Analyze why:  $\begin{cases} \text{Lack of intelligence skills} \\ \text{constraint on flight time} \\ \text{AGC exemption that skills could proceed} \end{cases}$

Because of limited number of flights authorized, CIA  
made it a practice not to fly unless weather over  
most of critical targets was less than 35% poor at  
Poor weather + 4 separate flights  $\Rightarrow$  longer time  
to get requested photo coverage.

[B.I.: notes — no new targets required.]

He said that he had no objection to the proposed  
route and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to  
establish our right to fly over international waters.

On the other hand, he recognized the necessity for  
obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines & the  
southern portion of Cuba at the time. He felt, however,  
that it is unwise to combine extensive overflying of  
international waters with actual overflights. He pointed  
out that the long planned flight would draw undue  
attention to the mission and further that should the  
aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight  
had occurred, this would place the US in a very poor  
position for standing on its rights to overfly international  
waters.

Taking these views into account, the CG plans to  
break this proposed coverage - into four parts - the  
Isle of Pines, the area roughly east of us, and two  
legs along the coast - one north and one south.

(See 2nd proposal of 4 parts.)

88. Lt. COMOS reviewed results.

98. Lt. " " to A/OC.

purple 554 st

Mission didn't cover file of Pines (3AM) & get Cans.

& other eastern areas which could be searched

for SAM and possible SAM depots.

Records with names is now in weather prints  
for targets mentioned above.

O/Int R told COMOS that <sup>2d</sup> State had acted with  
Cans could be covered by peripheral means.  
(20 miles out).

103. Lt. COMOS replied: could not satisfy requests for  
other  
Bones, or search for 3AM's further inland, nor  
for further MiG-21 contact on island bases nor for  
technical intell.

108. Lt. Special duty (of?) in HQ's office after  
2 U-2 incidents. Tom Bennett wrote memo:  
Lie State, AG, A/OC, & others, Lie State expressed  
concern at C4's planned coverage of Iba, involving  
extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs  
ninthly over Cuban air space, all in one flight.

1 Sept special duty of COMOR in light of 29 Aug results.  
Requirements for next flight agreed. No need for 36 action

with regard to airflight  
Because of known SAM sites plus need for destruction of  
Bombs, COMOR thought first flight should be brought  
to attention of Acting DCI.

4 Sept: Mens from COMOR to AGDCI asking approval:  
In view of finding SAM sites on western end of  
island, it is particularly important that as soon  
as weather permits the next additional mission  
should cover those areas of the island which  
were not photographed because of weather or  
because the range did not permit.

AGDCI: That the complex at the eastern end of  
island should be photographed again, but  
there is no request at this time for  
recceage of the SAM sites.

5 Sept: eastern & central portions of island; land cover  
in Ect.

O-2 flights began 26 Oct 60. Till 12 Nov, 62; 54 flights.

After 12 Nov, 2 flights.

2 extra in fine.

12 Nov: SG (Arg) agreed to continue 4 months.

19 Nov: MCC proposals: 4 months (covered by existing  
authorisation). That will expire, though  
revision of CG monthly forecast, flights planned  
for each succeeding month.

30 Nov: SG approved 2 for Arg.

5 Dec: results inadequate, severe malfunction; CO 402  
registered 2 more flights in Arg.

8 Dec: flight cancelled; consulted for bad weather,  
sp. factors.

9 Dec: SG: second mission when OCO results necessary.

If 3rd mission necessary later in month,  
should be considered in its merits at the time.

Alerts: 10 Dec for 12; 17 Dec; daily between 17-24 Dec, when  
mission cancelled. (Canceller).

Next mission delayed by weather till 29 Dec.

8 Dec sites.

30 Dec: SG approved forecast for 2 flights for 8 Dec.

SNE 80-62, 17 Mar. Threat to US Security Situation in  
Cuba Area

NIE 85-62 21 March Sit & Prospects in Cuba

NIE 85-2-62 1 Aug " "

CNIE 85-3-62 19 Sept. Military Build up in Cuba.

Estimates depended on included: a) overall law policy;  
military policy w.r.t. US; b) law policy w.r.t. Cuban  
leaders; c) relations with Castro, forces in Cuba,  
and the military build-up.

Est. conclusions:

a) Law policy w.r.t. US: To avoid the risk of  
confrontation with a high degree of risk of I forcing  
Cuba, or (ii) going to war.

b) in L.A. + Cuba: policy designed to avoid military  
by other than military means, and this would be  
guaranteed by strat. base.

c) Military build up probably important with these  
policies.

7 Oct } (Canc?)

13 Oct } restrictions on publicly offensive weapons discussed  
in USIB.

(info, often and 8 Oct, was included in briefings and memo  
by DIA for SecDef and JCS.)

(State? But not H-6? Pres?)

17 Oct Interim letter - USIB entry setting up P3A&M

(Pres order 10 Oct)

Discrim of new info on offensive items limited to  
USIB personnel only

Restrictions

My 6/2: DCI told analysts to deal out with NRIC  
as reports unacceptable to photo verification.

Mid-Aug: (22 Aug) DCI brief Pres on increasing value  
of agent-source reports; Pres directed  
my effort to check out these reports. DCI told DDCI  
to check my available source, particularly VPAC.

[Then, weather forecasts on photos  
affected in initiation don't publishing].

Instruction from DCI to be interpreted by CIA analysts as  
a restriction on publishing anything that could not be  
verified by NRIC's B (except one item on 24/7, nothing  
unacceptable... was published in CB, Survey or Analyst  
but had not been so verified).

31 Aug: Pres ordered USG, through Acting DCI, not to publish  
results of 29 Aug flight D1 policy decided

(Did this include opinions on Banca, or  
jet 34/7? Can's material to left?)

Exes published 17<sup>2,14</sup> Oct; 34/7 after 4 Sept.

still hard under fbo ception program  
See "Deception" Cuban court decision against U.S.

NSB Collected Watch Report... fully coordinated.  
It seems weekly... crisis areas.

(See on agenda 26 Aug; revised 28 Aug.)

Effect of restraints on liaison used to concentrate  
info at decision-making levels of Govt.

[Contrast to normal situation; effects?]

[Was Cuban response hampered by  
lack of prior planning? Might it have been,  
if developed differently?]

News 62: CIA Cuban Daily Survey established a limit  
on support to offices responsible for clandestine collection  
ops... subject to publishing restrictions.

[Used as reason for Pro Checklist?]

[No items in effective use in Checklist; <sup>authorities</sup> origins of files?]  
Established

Other highlights on 27 Aug. for Special Group (Argentia)  
to 19 Sept.